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 Abstract   
Much academic work on governance in recent years has explored responses which states 
have made to sectors of the economy, usually historically well-rooted nationally, which 
have been subject to globalizing pressures. Less work exists on responses which are 
being made to new parts of the economy emerging outside the nation state with 
inherently global characteristics. The Internet – and specifically its naming and 
addressing system - provides an example of how the state has aimed to assert public 
interest governance authority in a system initially absent its influence. This article 
explores the nature and consequences of this activity, in the process contributing to the 
study of the Internet and governance. Working within the limitations but also the 
opportunities created by policy norms developed at the global level, the article finds that 
the state has been instrumental in the development of novel public-private governance 
systems for Internet country code Top Level Domains. 
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Introduction  
Electronic network communications - traditionally composed of telecommunication and 
mass communication media - is the epitome of a fast-moving, dynamic sector of the 21st 
century international economy. The Internet, arguably the blazon of innovation in 
communication technologies, services and markets over the last 15 or so years is viewed 
by many as a communication frontier with radical transformative potential. Most 
situations of dynamic movement in technologies and markets tend to call forth debates on 
regulatory governance, often resulting in innovative change. Electronic network 
communication is a sector in which governance – and regulatory change in particular - 
have been important issues. Historically, the state in Europe has exercised a strong 
interventionist role, something which the development of the Internet appeared as a 
radical challenge to.  
The Internet provides a rare example of an economic (sub) sector which developed global 
credentials without initially having been rooted in nation state contexts in Europe. Whilst 
the expansion of Internet communication in its early - that is pre-popularisation - years 
did require functionally some form of coordination in those countries of Europe which 
adopted it, such activity occurred largely outside the knowledge of the state and was 
undertaken in a voluntary capacity by private interests. These national and international 
level technical pioneers liaised with each other in a cooperative manner. However, once 
the strategic economic and political significance of the Internet became clear to states in 
the late 1990s, efforts were made to assert what were perceived to be national interests of 
various kinds in Internet communication. This resulted in what Daniel Drezner (2004) 
has described as a process of the state bringing itself into Internet governance.  
The extent to which, and how, European states have been able to do this is the subject of 
this article. Its focus is the development in Europe of an under-addressed aspect of the 
complex governance constellation developing around the Internet: its system of naming 
and addressing and, specifically, the governance of the nomenclature system around 
country code Top Level Domains (TLDs). Though techno-functionally arcane, this area 
is important in public policy terms. The system provides users with access to vital 
electronic communications facilities. Names and addresses express personal, corporate 
and even national identity, around which a series of socio-political and commercial-
property rights have been expressed and defended. A core problem for the state, however, 
was that key elements of the global Internet community advocated strongly a diminished, 
preferably negligible, role for it in TLD governance (Drezner 2007). In what was 
considered an innately global communitarian environment, many questioned the need for 
a nationally based nomenclature system at all (see Mueller 1998). The Internet thus 
presented, potentially, a fertile ground for new governance forms and practices to 
flourish. This article provides much needed evidence of how states in Europe, have 
attempted to assert governance influence in global sectors controlled historically almost 
entirely by private interests. In the process, it makes a two-fold contribution to the study 
of the Internet and governance.  
First, it sheds important explanatory light on the evolving nature of regimes which have 
developed for the governance of ccTLDs in Europe. Here the state has become an 
important actor, but what is unusual, even novel, is the relationship between state and 
non-state actors which has evolved in ccTLD governance. The article shows how the 
governance of Internet country codes in Europe has diverged from changing patterns of 
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governance which have been occurring in the wider domain of electronic network 
communication. Though commercialisation is evident, state-shadowed private interest 
governance is the order of the day. The article shows through its case studies that private 
actors maintain a considerable ‘operational’ and ‘regulatory’ implementation role in 
ccTLD management within a non-hierarchical environment, albeit with a strong formal or 
informal ‘framework’ presence for the state. Second, the article explores this more deeply 
through extending existing conceptual work on governance. It shows how, in a 
globalising sector of the economy where its presence has been initially absent and then, 
on appearance, greeted with scepticism, the state is positioning itself to address a number 
of competing and potentially conflicting interests. The article uses the case of the ccTLDs 
to advance the evidence base for, and understanding of, emerging modes of governance 
and their implications. More specifically, it aims to advance understanding of relations 
between public (state) and private interests in globalising sectors within what Treib et al. 
(2007: 5) have recently described as the ‘continuum between public authority and societal 
self-regulation’.  
Structurally, the article proceeds as follows. The next section provides an overview of the 
main relevant conceptual aspects of the study of governance, placing particular focus on 
public-private governance interaction as a basis for subsequent examination of the ccTLD 
sector. Thereafter, the article illustrates briefly how the development of Internet 
governance differed from that evident in other better established parts of electronic 
network communication. Focusing on the policy issue of Top Level Domains, it shows 
how ccTLDs became vehicles for states to establish themselves and assert national 
interests in Internet governance. The penultimate section of the article provides a specific 
exploration of the core features of ccTLD governance in Europe through a focus on four 
national cases: France, Norway, Switzerland and the UK. These serve to illuminate the 
nature and extent of state involvement in this aspect of Internet governance. In its final 
section, the paper explores the implications of the findings of the previous sections and 
the case of ccTLDs for the study of governance.  
 
Modes of Governance and the Changing Role of the State  
The transition from the ‘corporate’ or ‘positive’ state to the ‘regulatory’ state driven as a 
response to the pressures of economic globalisation is a familiar one in European and 
global governance literature (see Cerny 2000; Jayasuriya 2001; Scharpf 1993, 1994, 
1996; Majone 1994, 1996, 1997;) An important idea running throughout this body of 
work is the shift from ‘government to governance’ and its implications for the role of the 
state in globalising sectors. The term governance has been used to refer to and 
conceptualise a wide variety of structural forms, institutions, actors and practices in and 
around the recent ‘empirical manifestation of state adaptation to its external environment’ 
(Pierre 2000: 3). Here systems, or ‘regulatory regimes’ (Eberlein and Grande 2005) can 
possess different degrees of hierarchy, can involve non-state public and private actors as 
well as the state; and often exist as ‘different types of networks and public-private 
partnerships’ (Kohler-Koch and Rittberger 2006: 29; see also Eising and Kohler-Koch 
1999). This approach accommodates readily an analysis of the capacities of state and 
non-state actors to exert influence in emerging socio-economic contexts such as the 
Internet. 
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Such definitions provide the backdrop for analytical tools aimed at understanding 
governance ‘types’ and ‘modes’. Here, an important distinction is often made in the 
literature between hierarchical and non-hierarchical governance. The former has been 
identified within both the corporate and regulatory states and is characterised by either 
direct or delegated intervention and formal regulation through law. The latter, also termed 
market or plurilateral governance (Zielonka 2007; Cerny, 1993), is characterised in 
contrast, by informal arrangements, voluntary codes of conduct and ‘soft’ law developed 
outside primary and secondary legislation. Whilst hierarchical governance is about 
compliance with clear lines of control and responsibility emanating from governmental 
authorities or their agents, the latter usually national regulatory authorities, non-
hierarchical governance can incorporate governance networks dominated by private 
actors. It reflects the pursuit of negotiation and persuasion, with incentives - rather than 
the threat of sanctions – deployed to achieve regulatory outcomes. There is a movement 
away from pyramidal (top-down) governance to ‘junction box’ (Richardson 2001) 
governance, with emphasis on ‘gardening’ rather than steering ‘reflecting principles of 
flexibility, subsidiarity, devolution and differentiation’ (Zielonka 2007: 192). Such non-
hierarchical governance chimes with the concept of the ‘post-regulatory state’ (Scott 
2004), which emphasises ‘alternative’ policy tools outside state law for influencing 
regulatory behaviour, and the role of professional community, practice and socialisation 
in securing compliance. So-called ‘new’ modes of governance developed recently at EU 
level, notably the Open Method of Coordination (OMC), also reflect the key features of 
post-regulatory state methods outside formal EU law, including benchmarking, peer-
review and standard setting, all couched in voluntarism (Eberlein and Kerwer 2004; 
Lodge 2007; Treib et al 2007). 
Advocates of non-hierarchical forms of governance argue that it provides greater 
flexibility and efficiency. It forms a context for ‘thick’ learning, allowing states to cope 
much better with the pressures of globalisation and regionalisation. However, it is by no 
means uncontested, most notably by states with strong dirigiste traditions. It is also open 
to criticism in terms of the legitimacy and accountability of agents to whom regulatory 
power has been effectively devolved. Whereas hierarchical governance enjoys legitimacy 
through its underpinning in a system of majority rule and a common national purpose 
(Zielonka 2007: 191), this is not so for non-hierarchical systems which can often operate 
outside public legal frameworks to some extent. Hierarchical governance enjoys a 
relative degree of transparency and accountability through elections. Private, self-
regulated, networks within non-hierarchical governance modes are neither democratically 
elected nor politically accountable. Non-hierarchical modes of governance also raise 
questions of compliance and effectiveness, though they may be more responsive to 
market changes than hierarchical governance modes, to the possible benefit of market 
players and consumers alike.  
However, any strict dichotomy between a hierarchical top-down public regulatory model 
and a private non-hierarchical model, whilst heuristically useful, tends to belie reality. 
Whilst new non-hierarchical governance modes aimed at meeting public policy goals in a 
globalised era (Howlett and Rayner 2006: 170) point to reduction in state involvement - 
and possibly state capacity - through reliance on private actors, it has also been 
recognised that the distinction between the public and the private sphere is by no means 
clear cut (Black 2002: 3; Ronit 2005). Often public and private spheres interact (Zielonka 
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2007): private governance not only needs recognition by the state but often ‘the state 
remains a central feature in understanding the governance functions undertaken by 
private actors in both domestic and international affairs’ (Graz and Nölke 2008: 20). 
Moreover, ‘governance…sets in motion a logic of action inventing new channels in the 
relations between formal and informal processes, as well as hierarchical and non-
hierarchical mechanisms of interaction’ (Graz and Nölke 2008: 14).  
In order to understand better the logics of action in any system exhibiting complexities of 
this kind, of which we argue ccTLD governance is an example, it is useful to provide 
typologies which assist in illuminating precisely public-private relationships. Treib et al. 
(2007) have recently referred to three such typological categories: politics (referring to 
actor constellations), polity (referring to institutional properties) and policy (referring to 
instruments at the disposal of regulatory actors). Depicted in Table 1 this is a useful 
starting point for identifying the modes of governance that occur within the three 
categories outlined. Such a framework typology, however, needs to be supplemented by 
more specific articulations of various possible kinds of public/private relationship.   
 
Table 1 - Dimensions and Modes of Governance 
 
 
 
State 
intervention 
 
Self 
regulation 
 
State 
intervention 
 
Self 
regulation 
 
State 
intervention 
 
Self  
regulation 
 
Public 
Actors  
 
Private  
Actors  
 
Hierarchical 
(coercive) 
 
Market (non-
hierarchical)  
 
Legal binding 
(legislation) 
 
Soft Law  
(codes of 
conduct) 
 
 
 
 Central 
authority  
Dispersed loci of 
authority  
Rigid 
Implementation  
Flexible 
Implementation  
  Institutionalised  Non-
institutionalised 
Sanctions No Sanctions 
(incentives) 
    Material 
Regulation 
Procedural 
Regulation 
    Fixed norms  Malleable norms 
(new 
governance) 
Source: Derived from Treib et al (2007)  
 
Table 2 brings this forward by providing a series of ‘ideal-type’ public-private 
interactions. The two diametrically opposite types are ‘concerted action’, on the one 
hand, and ‘voluntary action’, on the other (Verhulst and Price 2005). The latter occurs 
rarely and is germane to the idea of non-hierarchical governance with entirely self-
regulatory, private features and low levels of institutionalisation. The former corresponds 
to hierarchical governance, whereby the state sets the legal and regulatory backdrop for 
rule making and enforcement, and where relationships are highly institutionalised. It is 
important to note the potential overlap at the boundaries of each ideal type and the modes 
found therein. This is particularly likely in and around the cases of ‘sub-contracting’ and 
‘market-based/state shadowed self-regulation’. However, it might also exist at the 
margins of the classification. For example, within the hierarchical, regulatory state type 
of ‘concerted action’, some elements of soft law and flexibility through ‘framework 
Politics Dimension Polity Dimension Policy Dimension 
M
o 
d 
e 
s 
 
of 
 
G 
o 
v 
e 
r 
n 
a 
n 
c 
e 
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regulation’ can be found, the EU’s Directive on Electronic Commerce being a notable 
example in the Internet sector (see Christou and Simpson 2007). Another contrasting 
example is the practice of benchmarking, peer-review and standard setting, which is more 
usually associated with non-hierarchical governance, but can be found in the activities of 
public bodies, notably the EU, in recent years in the telecommunications sector.  
 
Table 2 – The governance  relationship continuum between the public and private sphere 
Hierarchical                Non-hierarchical 
Regulatory state…………………………………………………..Post-Regulatory State 
  ‘Concerted action’ ‘Subcontracting’ ‘Market-based/state 
shadowed self-
regulation’ 
‘Voluntary Action’ 
  
Where the state sets 
both formal and 
substantive 
conditions for rule-
making 
 
Governance:  
Public interest 
networks/agencies 
Actor constellation 
(Politics):  
Delegation of public 
functions to public 
actors 
Central authority: 
coercion/bargaining 
Polity: 
Legally binding 
instruments/legal 
framework,  
Policy: 
rigid implementation, 
material regulation, 
sanctions 
 
Where state 
involvement is limited 
to setting formal 
conditions for rule-
making with private 
actors then shaping the 
content. 
 
Governance:  
Public-private networks 
Actor constellation 
(Politics):  
Delegation of public 
functions to private 
actors 
Central/Dispersed loci 
of authority: 
bargaining, learning  
Polity: 
Legal framework, 
flexible/rigid 
implementation, 
procedural/material 
regulation, 
incentives/sanctions 
Policy: 
 
Involves industry-
setting, monitoring and 
enforcing standards in 
the knowledge that if it 
fails, state intervention 
could be imminent, that 
is, self-regulation in the 
shadow of the state 
 
Governance:  
Actor constellation 
Public-private 
networks/communities/
associations 
(Politics):  
Dispersed loci of 
authority: Persuasion, 
learning, arguing,  
Polity: 
Soft law, flexible 
implementation, 
procedural regulation, 
incentives 
Policy: 
 
Self-regulation can 
occur in a purely 
voluntary way with no 
direct state stimulus or 
intervention. 
 
Governance:  
Actor constellation 
Private interest 
networks/communities/
associations 
(Politics):  
Market: Persuasion, 
learning, arguing,  
Polity: 
Soft law, flexible 
implementation, 
procedural regulation, 
incentives 
Policy: 
 
Source: Derived from ‘Self-regulation of Digital Media’ (2004); Verhulst and Price (2005); NEWGOV 
(2004); Treib et al (2007)    
 
The main focus of the analysis of ccTLD governance in this article predominantly 
concerns the ‘politics’ and ‘polity’ dimensions. The typologies in Table 2 serve as 
analytical benchmarks, providing a useful point of departure for conceptualisation and 
cross-comparison of the regulatory governance regimes in the ccTLD sector at the 
national level in Europe. They also serve to illustrate the complexities of state 
involvement in the governance of key sectors of the 21st century economy. 
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Regulatory Governance in Electronic Network Communication and the Internet  
The recent governance of the ‘traditional’ parts of the electronic network 
communications sector in Europe stands in marked contrast to the Internet, not least its 
ccTLD system. In telecommunications, a sub-sector historically deeply rooted in the 
national political economy but which has undergone nothing short of revolutionary 
transformation since the 1980s, the replacement of direct state control of the monopoly 
service provider with competition in existing and new markets has been overseen by a 
series of independent public National Regulatory Authorities created by the state. Here, 
the traditional positive or corporate state in telecommunications has been replaced by a 
still very much hierarchical ‘regulatory’ state (see Humphreys and Simpson 2005). There 
has also been significant liberalisation and harmonisation activity conducted through the 
EU, though cross-national market penetration has been modest at best. Moreover, the 
global trends of liberalisation and (partial) privatisation in telecommunications have been 
evident in non-EU west-European states as well. Whilst private commercial - and to a 
much lesser extent civil society - interests have been able to exert influence on the 
direction of policy through lobbying processes, such parties have been given no formal 
role in day to day governance. Given the difficulty in engineering competition in 
telecommunications markets, no substantive self-regulatory elements exist here and seem 
unlikely to be introduced in the foreseeable future. Instead, competition law frameworks 
at national and EU levels may become more important. 
In broadcasting in the EU - like telecommunications deeply rooted in the national 
political economy of its nation states - neither the state nor private interests have played 
key regulatory roles historically. Instead, state-funded, though independent and self-
regulating, public service broadcasters (PSBs) dominated. As the 1980s and 1990s 
proceeded, broadcast networks became increasingly marketised, new commercial 
broadcasters operating alongside PSBs, many of whom began to adopt more commercial 
perspectives and practices themselves. Regulation of commercial broadcasters has 
occurred in classic hierarchical fashion through independent public national regulatory 
authorities.  
All of this differed markedly to the burgeoning Internet sector as the 1990s progressed. 
The nature of state involvement in Internet governance can be understood in the context 
of changing state functions of governance in a globalising world referred to in the 
previous section, on the one hand, and the peculiarities that underpinned the 
commercialisation of the Internet from its communitarian origins, on the other. Through 
the 1990s, a clamour to marketise the Internet as its commercial potential became 
apparent occurred. Philosophically and pragmatically, the inevitable ensuing move to 
proprietisation and profit seeking juxtaposed starkly with the views of those from the 
computer science technical community, mostly in North America, who pioneered the 
Internet’s development. The Internet’s emergence as a strategic economic and 
communications asset also soon gained the interest of states, a debate arising around how, 
if at all, it should be governed. Parè (2003; 47) defines two main schools of thought 
which developed as a consequence. Decentralists argued that ‘that the institutional norms 
that developed in tandem with the evolution of internetworking preclude the need for any 
external regulation or coordination of the modalities of cyberspace…the only policy 
 10 
required is that of laissez-faire’ (p 47). Here, Internet community self-governance and 
private sector initiative (voluntary action) was advocated with a clear rejection of any 
state regulation of the Internet. By contrast, the Commons School viewed the Internet as 
numerous elements which taken together might be considered as some form of socio-
economic commons. This holistic approach considered the constituent elements as 
interdependent leading to the view that various top-down regulatory frameworks should 
be created to ‘ensure the well-being of the conceptual whole’ (p 45). Elsewhere, 
academic work from a global governance system perspective has considered the Internet 
as an emerging regime (Franda 2001) and a more fluid Grand Collaboration (MacClean 
2004). 
The governance of the Internet’s system of naming and addressing developed from its ad 
hoc origins in the midst of this debate. There are two main identifiable forms of Top 
Level Domain in cyberspace: generic (gTLDs)  - relating to companies, organisations, 
and other generally recognisable organisational forms - of which there are now 19 and 
country code (ccTLDs)  - referring to states - of which there are 245. The number of 
registrations under ccTLDs has tripled from 12 million in 2000 to 33 million in 2005 
(OECD 2006: 10). In techno-functional terms, the domain name system is hierarchically 
ordered, the main purpose of which is to provide a mechanism for matching numerical 
Internet Protocol (IP) addresses that identify individual host computers on the Internet, 
with user-friendly, mnemonic, domain names on to which these map. At the core of the 
DNS, at the top of the hierarchy, is the authoritative ‘root’ computer server, holding the 
data which all other root servers copy in order to enable identification of information in 
the Top Level Domain, and subsequent levels below this (Second Level Domain, Third 
Level Domain etc).  
From the perspective of the Internet as a global communications system, this techno-
functional order is at least more accommodative - and may even point towards a 
deterministic logic - of gTLDs which have a ‘universality’ attached to them since they 
refer to generic socio-economic constituents. The situation is rather different for ccTLDs 
whose gravitational pull in governance terms tends to be towards the national, in 
considerable part, even though techno-functional authority from an internationally 
constituted centre is necessary to exist on the Internet. With the growth of the Internet, 
ccTLDs became strategic assets and thus have assumed political-economic significance: 
they provide identity and a platform for socio-economic development. This, plus the 
corollary that abuses of the system has led to increased concerns over user and system 
security, catalysed a greater interest from governments wishing to gain a stake in DNS 
governance.  
The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), a private, not-for-
profit, self-regulatory body, in 1999 assumed global governance responsibility for the 
critical technical and organisational resources required to regulate the DNS as a result of 
an at times fractious process of political-economic negotiation dominated by US 
commercial, technical and political interests (see Mueller 2004). Unusually for a global 
governance body, states were excluded from the decision-making process of ICANN, 
instead given only an advisory role its Governmental Advisory Committee (GAC). 
Whilst some movement has been made towards a more co-regulatory environment, this 
continues to remain the case. As a consequence, ICANN’s legitimacy for formulating and 
implementing the rules for non-territorial and less politically sensitive gTLDs has been 
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gradually and broadly accepted. Along the way, there have nonetheless been numerous 
points at which its operational structure and procedures have been criticised, not least in 
respect of the creation of new gTLDs. The situation has been much more controversial in 
respect of ccTLDs which must be recognised by ICANN to exist in the Internet’s 
nomenclature system. Whilst emanating from the same ‘decentralist’ philosophy 
highlighted above, they have evolved within a ‘territorial’ milieu within which states 
have been more easily able to exert a ‘national interest’.  
This has meant that from the outset, the relationship between ICANN, at the global level 
of Internet addressing, country code TLD registries, and states, at the national level, has 
often been fractious. Control over ccTLDs has been a particular issue of contestation, 
with territorial interest, national symbolism and access to the global electronic economy 
being key issues that underpinned deliberations. The initial informal, plurilateral model 
for ccTLD administration and delegation developed by the US Internet pioneer, Jon 
Postel, in the mid 1980s - underpinned by the RFC 1591 document1
In order to remedy this situation, the country code Name Supporting Organization 
(ccNSO) was established in 2002 to provide a voice to ccTLD administrations within the 
ICANN process, and to enable ICANN to provide better support to ccTLD managers in 
delivering its name delegation function; to develop proposals for best practice for 
ccTLDs; and to coordinate with other ICANN committees and bodies on ccTLD issues. 
New non-hierarchical ‘contractual’ structures were also agreed providing more flexibility 
and choice for ccTLD administrations in terms of the engagement frame and relationship 
they wished to pursue with ICANN. For those that sought to establish a formal 
relationship, an ‘Accountability Framework’ was elaborated setting out clearly the 
responsibilities of both ICANN and ccTLDs. Alternatively, a system of ‘letter exchange’ 
was designed for ccTLDs that desired a more informal arrangement with ICANN, 
whereby there was agreement on broad guidelines for the respective responsibilities of 
each party (
 and delivered 
through IANA - had become unsustainable once governments awoke to the strategic 
importance of the Internet. ICANN’s attempt to formalise its relationship with 
governments through its Corporate Policy (ICANN 1999) and GAC principles (ICANN 
2000), the latter recognising the sovereignty of national governments over their domain 
names, led initially only to protracted disagreement between ICANN and certain ccTLD 
managers and governments over its authority and legitimacy in terms of the 
delegation/re-delegation of domain names in particular (Christou and Simpson 2008).  
http://ccnso.icann.org/). 
In addition voluntary guidelines setting out a rationale for ccTLD fee contributions to the 
ICANN budget (a source of great contestation for many ccTLD administrations) were 
established in order to provide an equitable distribution of cost across the ccTLD 
community based on size and revenue (http://ccnso.icann.org/)2. The relationship 
between the national and global level, however, despite these changes, has merely 
improved at the margins, and can still only best be described as in flux, reflective of the 
Internet governance regime more broadly (confirmed by authors’ interviews 20083). 
There still remain tensions which have culminated, on the one hand, in some ccTLD 
administrations advocating a stronger and more direct policy role for themselves within 
ICANN, and on the other, with the majority of ccTLDs still not ccNSO members (only 
55 out of the 264 that exist, and only 8 of the 55 are from Europe) and without having 
signed a formal contract with ICANN4. The reasons for this are related to imprecise and 
 12 
still contested ccTLD governance responsibility and also the normative dimensions of 
domain name governance. First, there is dispute over the meaning of ‘subsidiarity’ as a 
governance tool – and the question of precisely which ccTLD policy matters should be 
addressed globally rather than locally. Second, there is an ongoing questioning of the 
legitimacy of ICANN to govern the DNS (OECD 2006: 37).5
It is clear that to create a commercially efficient and public policy protective ccTLD at 
the national level requires some degree of consensus and convergence on guiding 
principles and practical rules for ccTLD governance between the global and national 
levels, and between public and private actors within the policy process. The evidence 
suggests that there is a more positive relationship evolving between ccTLDs and ICANN 
in Europe but that many registries do not advocate a policy or governance role for 
ICANN in the ccTLD domain (authors’ interviews 2008). Moreover, governance of 
ccTLDs in Europe, whilst reflective of voluntary governance principles established 
historically, and observable for gTLDs, has evolved in a markedly different way, with 
increasing opportunity for the politicisation of the governance process through 
government involvement. How this has happened and the precise nature of this 
involvement will be addressed in the remainder of this article.   
 
 
Patterns of ccTLD Governance in Europe 
In Europe, the core governance functions of ccTLD systems are undertaken by a series of 
registries which are the central nodes in a ccTLD governance network (see Fig 1). 
Registries have been established predominantly as independent, commercially oriented 
entities, though operational on a not-for-profit basis (that is, cost recovery with some 
provision for financial contingency (OECD 2006: 19). The registry is the guardian of 
information, through stewardship of the ‘Whois’ database, on users who have registered 
names under a typical ccTLD and makes decisions on how much, and what kind, of 
information on users is made publicly available. It is responsible for regulating the 
behaviour of the ccTLD registrar industry, comprised of companies competing, often 
aggressively, to register a name for a user under the ccTLD. The registry has been 
responsible for setting the price of registrations per name and, in many cases, establishing 
a code of conduct for registrar companies to comply with. The registry is also responsible 
for hearing complaints from commercial players and customers involved in the ccTLD 
business. This has involved matters such as receiving submissions about commercial mal-
practice and infringement of claimed legitimate rights to a name, principally trademark 
but also public sector. The registry, in many cases, is responsible for overseeing the 
system which has been set up to adjudicate on disputes between parties regarding domain 
names. Here, Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) services are offered where (often 
online) hearings are held to resolve conflicts without recourse to the formal legal system. 
Occasionally, registries have aimed to settle disputes on a more informal basis prior to 
ADR being operationalised, a clear example of sectoral self-regulation.  
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Figure 1: Core Features of ccTLD Governance in Europe  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
           
            
 
 
 
                                                                   
      
   
   
 
 
 
 
 
                 
 
  
 
However, despite the prevalence of private governance in ccTLDs the state has 
developed a formal relationship with its ccTLD registry as often as it has an informal one 
(OECD 2006). Formal relationships vary in their degree of hierarchy and can comprise 
input to the management of the ccTLD registry or the creation of directly applicable 
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governance body since it was established in 1987 by the Swiss state and the university 
sector as a foundation of the private sector. It provides a clear example of a delegated (by 
the state) public-private governance system. It is important to note that in the late 1980s, 
there was no direct government involvement in the Swiss domain name system due in 
part to a lack of understanding of its significance and potential future strategic 
importance. The Internet had not reached the developmental stage of being a mass 
medium and because of the relative lack of demand for names, SWITCH was able to 
delegate them free of charge to those pioneer users requesting them (authors’ interview, 
July 2008). An important change occurred in 1996, when the Swiss state introduced the 
idea of ‘holdership’, that is the right of use only of a domain name. Here names are not 
sold to customers but instead a fee is charged for services around their usage (Schneider 
2005). The aim of this move was nothing short of asserting ultimate state ownership of 
domain names under the Swiss TLD (authors’ interview, 2008). Another significant 
venture by the state into the TLD domain occurred in 2002 when the Swiss government 
decided to take over responsibility for oversight of its ccTLD. This occurred for a number 
of reasons. By the early part of the decade, the importance of the ccTLD as a means of 
demonstrating national identity had become clear and, beyond this, dot ch was considered 
to be an important means of securing a Swiss presence in cyberspace. The other main 
reason for this development was more pragmatic and reflective of the commercial aspects 
of ccTLDs. By 2002, domain names had become commodified and were viewed by the 
state as something of a scarce resource, which was in need of regulation to ensure a fair 
distribution. These two main reasons were underpinned by ideological preferences of the 
Swiss government of the time, which tended to favour a more interventionist stance when 
considered necessary (authors’ interview, 2008). Thus, in 2003, a set of regulations for 
dot ch were laid out in law in the Federal Constitution through the Telecommunications 
Act. An administrative contract between the Swiss telecommunications national 
regulatory authority, OFCOM, which plays a public oversight role, and SWITCH was 
established.  
The Swiss consider the governance of their ccTLD to be a public-private partnership with 
shared responsibilities between the state and the ccTLD registry to deliver the public 
policy and operational aspects of dot ch. Theoretically the system is predominantly, 
though not exclusively, ‘hierarchical’ in nature, involving elements of ‘concerted action’ 
and ‘subcontracting’, in our terms. The governance mechanics of dot ch are conducted 
according to a ‘business-like’ modus operandi, something which private sector Swiss 
Internet Service Providers pressed hard for around the time of the proposed government 
stewardship of dot ch. From a SWITCH perspective, initial skepticism about government 
intervention was assuaged by the expectation that state backstop protective powers could 
reduce possible liability of the registry in a situation where the volume of registration 
activity was increasing significantly. The registry was also closely involved in the 
drafting process of the regulatory framework administered by OFCOM on the state’s 
behalf (authors’ interview, 2008). Unlike in most other European cases, SWITCH 
undertakes registration functions from domain name applicants which apply directly to it 
(OFCOM and SWITCH 2003). There are, however, a range of support organizations in 
the system whose function is ‘registrar-like’ in that they provide customer support and 
ensure that accurate data is supplied to the dot ch Whois database (authors’ interview, 
2008), guardianship of which is the responsibility of SWITCH. A system of ADR exists 
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whose first phase, mediation, is mandatory (Schneider 2005) and is carried out by the 
WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center which provides a list of experts for approval by 
OFCOM. The underpinning goals of the Swiss system are to ensure credibility for the 
registry, transparency in the system of registration, and shared responsibilities between 
the registry (functional and operational mostly) and government (representational in 
international fora mostly) (Schneider 2005). The system of governance for dot ch has 
been described as ‘a very uncommon and special case’ (authors’ interview, 2008) within 
the broader Swiss communications milieu, and provides an indication of how the state 
has tried to develop novel governance responses to a new area of electronic network 
communication with global characteristics.  
The Norwegian registry for dot no, Norid, claims that it is a ‘neutral actor’, ‘anchored in 
a strong social responsibility’ (Norid 2007a). Norid is regulated by the Domain Name 
Regulation which is part of the 2003 Electronic Communications Act and, like the Swiss 
case, is under the aegis of its national telecommunications regulatory authority. Norid is 
part of UNINETT AS, the National Academic Research Network, which was delegated 
responsibility for dot no by the state in 1987. This is a parent company containing four 
subsidiaries which supply universities and research institutions with ICT services, as well 
as undertaking what are described as ‘national ICT tasks’ under which the dot no registry 
function falls. Since UNINETT is owned by the Norwegian state through its Ministry of 
Education and Research, the system is overwhelmingly characterized by ‘sub-
contracting’ though there are also elements of  ‘concerted action’ due to the backstop 
regulatory role played by the Norwegian telecommunications regulator. Norid is an 
unusual organization to have been devolved regulatory responsibility – it is a novel 
example of a publicly owned (but private) company undertaking a number of key 
governance functions. Like most ccTLDs, the administration of dot no at its inception in 
1983 occurred on an ad hoc voluntary basis – governance through ‘voluntary action’ - 
from within the research arm of the then state run telecommunications service provider. 
Like the Swiss case, Norid operates as a not-for-profit company. The rationale for giving 
responsibility for the running of dot no to UNINETT (through Norid) was technocratic - 
it possessed the necessary technical expertise, on the one hand, and operational neutrality, 
on the other (author’s email 2008). 
Norid’s main tasks concern processing applications for registration under dot no, which it 
receives from companies in the competitively ordered domain name registration business, 
begun in 1999, with now more than 400 firms in it. A detailed set of operational 
guidelines has been produced for registrars which must enter into an agreement with 
Norid. The system contains an ADR function in which Norid acts as a secretariat in 
collating necessary statements from parties to a dispute. There is an independent ADR 
body which adjudicates disputes, having handled 82 cases (Norid 2007a) at the time of 
writing.  From 2001, it became possible to register multiple names under dot no and from 
2003 Norid’s status changed into a separate limited-liability company (Norid 2007b). An 
official at Norid has commented that ‘the administrative model for the .no 
domain…combines a domain name policy set by the registry (in consultation with the 
Norwegian community) with a high-level administrative framework set by the Norwegian 
government through regulation. Added to this mix is a private sector registry that is 
owned by the Norwegian state’ (authors’ interview, 2008). Conceptually, Norid reflects a 
form of ‘subcontracting’, but it is also novel in the overlap between modes, within what 
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is essentially a ‘hierarchical’ regime. Whilst there is strong framework legislation on 
domain names embedded within the Electronic Communications Act (2003), the 
operational aspect of the business is delegated to a private sector registry, which operates 
with a network of other dispersed public and private actors, with some flexibility in terms 
of policy development. Importantly, whilst the Domain Name Regulation sets out general 
principles, domain name policy is a contract governed by private law (authors’ interview, 
2008).  
From 1986-1997, the ccTLD in France was under the control of the French National 
Institute for Information Technology and Automation research (INRIA). Dot fr was 
initially used mostly by INRIA researchers and later the French Research and 
Development community (authors’ interview, 2008) before the popularization of the 
Internet. Its expansion in France in the mid 1990s, as elsewhere in Europe, witnessed the 
emergence of a series of ISPs, whose increasing presence led to the setting up of an NIC 
(Network Information Centre) Consultative Committee in 1994 composed of a 
representative of INRIA and ISPs with international commercial presence. This was 
followed, in 1995, by the creation of a Naming Charter of rules for domain name 
assignment (authors’ interview, 2008). Until this point, the system bore many of the 
hallmarks of ‘voluntary action’, though in 1997 the French state intervened to change the 
nature of dot fr governance very considerably. The system was made a part of French 
law, accompanied by the establishment of the registry AFNIC by INRIA and the French 
government. AFNIC operates as a not-for-profit association without shareholders 
(Gorichon 2005). AFNIC has an ADR procedure which draws on the World Intellectual 
Property Organization’s Universal Disputes Resolution Policy. Since 2006, AFNIC and 
the Internet Rights Forum have operated the ‘Mediateur du Net’ service (AFNIC 2007), 
though disputes have also been dealt with in the French courts. 
AFNIC’s management structure is a reflection of the dilemma of a traditionally 
mercantilist state such as France in the governance of a communications asset with both 
social and commercial imperatives. On the one hand, the presence of the state is very 
much in evidence in the management structure of the registry, the aim being to secure 
‘co-development’. Here, as much as half the board of management of AFNIC come from 
the public sector, or ‘founder members’, as they are described: two representatives from 
INRIA and three from French government through, respectively, the Ministries for 
Telecommunications, Industry, and Research. Article 22 of AFNIC’s Articles of 
Association states that it ‘may be dissolved at the request of the founder members of the 
association in order to entrust the continuation of the Association’s activity to a general 
interest legal entity with a similar purpose’. Whilst it was undoubtedly the case that the 
changes of the late 1990s were a response to increased demand for domain names in 
France as the Internet grew commercially (authors’ interview 2008), the French 
government (2003: 2) has also stated unequivocally that in France, ‘the ccTLD is held to 
be a public or collective resource that cannot come under the heading of private property 
and must be managed in the general interest…governments’ in the final instance have 
authority over the ccTLDs pertaining to their territory’. 
It is paradoxical therefore that there has been a very significant move in the direction of 
liberalisation in the ccTLD market in France since approximately 2000. Once one of the 
most restrictive ccTLDs in Europe, in May 2004, through the current French postal and 
electronic communications law, it was made bureaucratically less burdensome (more 
 17 
flexible) for companies to register under dot fr, which resulted in an 88% growth in 
registrations in the following year (OECD 2006: 17). In June 2005, a further 
liberalisation occurred when the AFNIC board decided to open up dot fr to private 
individuals to register third level domains (that is a domain sold under the second level) 
under dot fr (ibid). This liberalisation was driven by belief that ‘the market was mature 
enough to address potential litigation’ arising from disputes around dot fr usage. By 
contrast, the French government also became concerned about the need to liberalize 
access for individual citizens to dot fr (authors’ interview, 2008).   
It is also clear that a much more market-oriented approach is being developed by AFNIC. 
In 2005, it launched a brand image survey, a procedure for the selection of publicity 
agencies and began to draft a new communications plan. It also created a series of 
relations support measures with the French registrar business, involving meeting them, 
consultation to determine their expectations and assembling a network of AFNIC 
correspondents in them to deal with information dissemination and feedback (AFNIC 
2005: 12-13). AFNIC has also set up ‘technical, marketing and communications working 
groups and legal workshops’ (Weill 2005: 7). In this case, clear evidence exists of a mix 
of commercialisation and non-hierarchical governance measures. It suggests a strong 
stimulus to ensure that the French ccTLD develops into an internationally leading system, 
something which is only realistically achievable in the global TLD industry through 
adhering to key norms of the sector as they developed outside France. However, the 
significant presence of the state in AFNIC suggests that the French system contains 
important elements of ‘concerted action’ and ‘sub-contracting’. The French government 
has promoted the public-private hybrid nature of the dot fr governance system as an 
innovative model, stemming from a pragmatic realization that the French ccTLD could 
not be managed through a public institution given the evolutionary history of the Internet 
(authors’ interview 2008). However, this had led to tensions within AFNIC where market 
players have been frustrated by the state’s presence where this is perceived not to take 
account of market realities (authors’ interview 2008).     
An important further move in the direction of liberalisation occurred in 2007 with a 
proposed modification to the French Telecommunications Regulation, which sets out the 
basic principles relating to domain name governance. Here, a selection procedure for the 
dot fr registry, involving the French minister for electronic communications choosing the 
company to act as the registry for dot fr was proposed as well as a series of pubic policy 
rules related to the protection of public names (authors’ interview 2008). This suggests 
the creation of periodic competition to become the registry and was described as a 
profound change to the French ccTLD regulatory environment by the AFNIC president 
(Gorichon 2007: 6). It also is clearly illustrative of the way in which the French are 
developing state-sanctioned liberalisation that aims to reconcile French interventionist 
public policy tendencies with the established liberal modus operandi of the global 
Internet TLD sector. 
The UK ccTLD provides an example of a very liberalised and commercially successful 
system. By July 2007, there were six million registered domain name holders under dot 
uk and it was reported that UK users were six times more likely to opt for the dot uk TLD 
than the dot com generic TLD (Nominet 2007a). Like most ccTLDs, the governance of 
dot uk occurred initially through classic ‘voluntary action’ administered in the 1980s by 
an organization known as the Naming Committee. As the 1990s proceeded, in line with 
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global trends in the development of the domain name industry, domain names 
management was formalised through the creation in 1996 of Nominet, the dot uk registry, 
as a private not-for-profit concern (Nominet 2007b) over which its private members have 
ultimate control. However, unlike the other cases, formalisation did not signal 
politicization, or more precisely, ‘hierarchical’ state intervention in the governance of dot 
uk. The initiative to establish Nominet was industry based, and emanated from 
dissatisfaction with the operational and administrative mechanics and procedures of the 
Naming Committee. This accorded it legitimacy within industry circles but also impacted 
positively on the UK government’s perception of Nominet and the regulatory principles 
that underpinned it. The UK government was not concerned with Nominet’s monopoly 
control over dot UK as it firmly believed that any potential abuse of this situation could 
be dealt with through existing regulatory legislation and bodies. The only issue for the 
UK government, therefore, was whether the proposed regulatory model for Nominet – 
underpinned by openness, transparency, inclusiveness, flexibility, and objectivity – was 
congruent with the direction of UK public policy (see Paré 2003: 87-95). This was 
underpinned by the notion in relation to Internet governance that ‘existing legal and 
administrative frameworks for consumer protection and fair trading were in place that 
were on the whole adequate and applied equally well online as they did offline’ (authors’ 
interview 2004). 
Nominet recently initiated steps to create a voluntary independent code of practice in 
which it aimed to act as a facilitator of discussions between different parties involved in 
the domain name business (Nominet 2006). It adopts a highly commercial approach to its 
activities. For example, in 2005, it undertook a ‘brand’ re-launch involving an attempt to 
improve its commercial image and, in 2006, appointed a director of marketing and 
communications with the aim of analyzing its current and future market to develop a 
better knowledge of  ‘purchasing and renewal behaviours’. An interesting goal is the 
pursuit of ‘thought leadership’, where the registry aims to express views on key issues. 
Nominet has declared itself interested in ‘bring[ing] together different stakeholders to 
encourage solutions, debate and discussion through dialogue and information sharing’ 
(Nominet 2006: 7), classic non-hierarchical policy activity. Nominet has recognized the 
tension existing in its governance role between balancing ‘the requirements of 
stakeholder participation with the need to make decisions within acceptable timescales’. 
It has declared a wish to be an ‘informed and sensible commentator…promoting self-
regulation and an enabling environment for innovation and growth’ (Nominet 2006: 9). It 
has argued that its ‘unique position in the Internet industry in the UK means that it has to 
liaise frequently with, and attempt to influence, government’ (Nominet Council of 
Management 2002a: 1).  
Thus dot UK functions in operational and regulatory terms predominantly as a system of 
‘voluntary action’, although there is nevertheless the shadowing presence of the UK state 
in evidence. Nominet also has a Policy Advisory Board (Nominet Policy Advisory Board 
2007a: 1) which at the time of writing contains a member of the UK government 
Information Commissioner’s office, the UK Department of Trade and Industry and the 
UK All Party Internet Group (Nominet Policy Advisory Board Reports, 2007a and b). Its 
own recently created Code of Conduct defines the PAB’s role as ‘assist[ing] with policy 
decision-making at Nominet’ where the PAB is seen as a representative body for interests 
‘who include Nominet and its staff, its members, .uk domain name registrants, internet 
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users, the PAB members’ employers, or the organizations they represent, fellow PAB 
members…civil society, industry and the government’ (Nominet Policy Advisory Board 
2007c: 1). Clearly government is only one actor among a wide miscellany in this 
‘inclusive’ advisory body.  
 
Conclusions 
Much academic work on governance in recent years has explored the responses which 
states have made to sectors of the economy, usually historically well-rooted nationally, 
which have been subject to globalizing pressures. Very little work exists, however, on the 
responses which are being made to new parts of the economy which emerge outside the 
nation state with inherently global characteristics. The Internet, and specifically its 
ccTLD sub-sector, provides one such example. It stands out, not least, because of the 
deep national centricity of older parts of electronic network communication. Equally 
striking is the different approaches taken by states to recent globalizing trends evident in 
these sub-sectors of communications, such as telecommunication, when compared to 
ccTLD governance. 
The ccTLD sector provides an interesting example of where governance was initially in 
the form of ‘voluntary action’ before the Internet’s strategic importance and mass 
communication potential were realized. Thereafter, evidence from Europe suggests that 
states have taken considerable pains to organise its governance to negotiate a position 
between different national public interest priorities and the features of Internet 
governance developed at the global institutional level. The case study provides evidence 
of the ways in which states can develop a presence in sectors which did not grow up in 
their national territories and which rely on the global institutional level for techno-
functional coordination. Unlike the case of its sister gTLDs, the ‘territorial’ nature of 
ccTLDs has led the state and its representatives in ccTLD governance, to attempt to 
assert perceived interests at the global level, with often disharmonious consequences. 
Some evidence of this kind of approach has already been found in TLD governance at the 
EU institutional level (see Christou and Simpson 2006), though this article suggests the 
phenomenon to be much more widespread across Europe. 
In the consequent governance models, (quasi) private actors play the key roles. On the 
one hand, a form of private interest ‘management’ and ‘stewardship’ is evident where the 
pursuit of public interest goals is important. The protection of information and 
intellectual property rights of individuals and corporate public and private entities; 
promotion of ‘national’ Internet presence; the attempt to preserve a ccTLD as some form 
of collective ‘resource’ to be used by the so-called ‘Internet community’, all feature 
significantly. On the other hand, the ccTLD in Europe is a commercial phenomenon in 
which image and marketing, growth in terms of the number of registrations, issues like 
customer service, efficiency, corporate accountability and accrual of capital through 
enterprise for future investment are considered to be measures of success.  
Within each of these ‘public interest’ and ‘liberal-commercial’ dimensions, the state 
clearly has a vested interest in creating a successful, robust and efficient environment. 
Unlike in other states of the world which have asserted a much more hierarchical control 
of their ccTLD, for example China, in Europe states have devolved the mechanics of 
activity related to governance to the commercial, though non-profit-making, domain 
occupied by the ccTLD registry, which in turn governs activities of registrar companies 
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and ADR providers. The article’s case studies also illustrate the variety which exists at 
the national level. It is important to note that elements of the four different typological 
categories in Table 2 exist in each case study, though the degree to which each is present 
differs. The UK has been a forerunner in liberalising communications governance in 
recent decades and it is therefore unsurprising that its system is the closest to ‘voluntary 
action’. The other three cases examined provide examples of differing degrees of more 
hierarchical state-sanctioned (quasi) private interest governance. A hybrid public-private 
entity in the Norwegian case - that is, state owned, independent non-profit-making and 
market-based - undertakes key governance functions. In Switzerland, a private foundation 
of the university sector undertakes ccTLD governance. In both cases, the 
telecommunications regulator plays an oversight role. In France too, an independent 
commercially conscious registry has, nevertheless, strong representation of the French 
state on its governing board. These cases illustrate examples in the electronic 
communications sector of compromise between national public policy concerns and 
sectoral characteristics developed at the global level. Further research could explore the 
extent to which this phenomenon exists elsewhere in the international political economy.  
An important research question raised by the modes of regulatory governance identified 
in the case studies is the extent to which the evolving systems have proven efficacious. 
Thus far, it does appear that they have functioned with sound practical policy efficacy. 
However, whilst our case studies have generally not illustrated any significant 
disadvantages at the operational level, it is clear that potential problems do exist. For 
example, in the Norwegian case it is acknowledged that ‘the somewhat complex 
procedures required of all public sector bodies (especially if they want to change a 
law/regulation) can make it a challenge for such registries to keep up with the demands of 
speed and flexibility from the ever-changing world of the Internet’ (e-mail 
communication, Norid 2008). Moreover, the French case demonstrated this problem 
clearly, particularly the paradox between liberalising the operational and policy 
dimensions of ccTLD governance, within an environment where there is increasing state 
involvement through public policy rules. This has not only led to uncertainty in the 
ccTLD market in France, but also a situation where ‘strong participation of publicly 
appointed members makes it difficult to take into account the reality of the market’ 
(authors’ interview 2008). Conversely, there are also advantages through having the 
‘state’ involved in ccTLD governance within our case study countries, most importantly 
ensuring legal protection through public policy frameworks. The evidence in terms of our 
‘voluntary action’ or, more precisely, UK market-based model, suggests a responsible 
and inclusive approach in the service of society, with no specific disadvantages alluded 
to. However, within such models the question often arises of how to ensure that this 
remains so in the future.  
On a broader note Wigger and Nolke (2007: 506) argue that the professional and 
technical character of private interest regulation makes it more difficult to criticize whilst, 
in such systems, ‘the use of an apolitical image serves to hide the wider consequences of 
new regulation, thereby preventing the mobilization of negatively affected groups’. There 
have been cases of attempts to abuse ccTLDs where the registry has had to resort to the 
formal legal system. Elsewhere, registries have documented cases where the ADR 
process has settled disputes between parties satisfactorily and others still, notably in 
France, where agreement has been reached in cases of conflict before convening an ADR 
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panel was considered necessary. On a pragmatic level then, the system has functioned 
effectively and efficiently. Zielonka (2007: 204-05) argues that non-hierarchical, 
decentralized systems of governance may promote enhanced deliberation reducing the 
likelihood of abuses of power and delivering accountability where ‘different centres 
watch each other’s moves and publicize abuses of power. Enhanced deliberation also 
contributes to accountability because issues are considered in more depth by a variety of 
actors’. Nonetheless, in the case of ccTLDs, the more commercialization proceeds, the 
greater is the prospect that public interest issues will struggle to maintain a presence. For 
example, whilst a reduction in requirements for registration may reduce red tape and 
bring the costs, and thus the price, to users of registering under a domain name down, this 
may also reduce the ability to curb the kinds of crime related to ccTLDs which may make 
them unattractive to users. There have also been examples of unfair commercial 
behaviour on behalf of registrars, where those with direct access to databases have been 
able to determine names whose renewal date is close with a view to acquiring them 
immediately on expiry because of their commercial potential (OECD 2006: 7). Another 
practice is to use the ability to query the system to buy up valuable names when a new 
second level domain is introduced. This then increases the cost to those wishing to 
purchase the domain in the secondary market (ibid: 22).  
In any event, it is clear that ccTLDs provide an interesting example of a novel form of 
governance in which the presence of the state has been far from abandoned. Rather, in 
Europe, the state sits within a network of a series of decentralized systems which, in 
operational and managerial terms, vary in their degree of hierarchy. This is distinctly 
different from merely creating a free market governed by competition law. Instead, the 
ccTLD registry plays the key governance role in the functioning, but also the policy 
evolution, of its TLD. The system relies on a balance between the functional dynamism 
and managerial efficacy of the registry, on the one hand, and its willingness to listen to 
the advice given by the pluri-interest characterized advisory boards which often monitor 
sectoral activity. Much will hinge on the extent to which the pluri- and multi- stakeholder 
governance characteristic of the Internet’s recent development can survive in an 
increasingly commercial and competitive domain name market. 
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ENDNOTES  
 
                                                 
1 The established International Organization for Standardization codification (ISO 3166-1) was utilized to 
define what could and could not be a ccTLD, even though this later proved to be politically controversial.   
2 According to the OECD (2006) the issue of financial contributions of certain ccTLDs to ICANN’s budget 
is still unresolved, despite this. A budget working group within the ccNSO is therefore still working on 
‘providing ccTLDs with costs associated to ICANN in performing IANA functions that are in the interest 
of ccTLDs’.  
3 Some of the empirical evidence gathered in the research on which this article is based comes from 
interviews conducted with representatives from ccTLD registries. The authors would like to express their 
gratitude those who agreed to be interviewed as part of the project. 
4 Details of those ccTLDs that have signed an agreement with ICANN can be found at: 
http://www.icann.org/cctlds/agreements.html  
5 Here, ccTLDs within Europe have developed a collective regional voice within and outside ICANN 
through the privately constituted Council of European National Top-Level Domain Name Registries 
(CENTR). CENTR has also been proactive in coordinating ccTLD policy, developing best practice, and 
undertaking projects on important organisational and policy issues impacting on ccTLDs in Europe (see 
http://www.centr.org/), and provides an example of a European transnational body involved in ‘new’ 
governance activities in the ccTLD sector. 
 
